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RECENT DECISIONS

II27

JunGEs-DISQUALIFICATION -DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY-An original
action in quo warranto was brought in the name of the state on the relation of
the Attorney General who later became a justice of the Supreme Court and
participated in the final decision. It was argued on motion for a rehearing that
this justice was disqualified by his prior connection with the case and that his
participation in tlie final decision made it erroneous. Held, he was not disqualified, but if he had been, he was nevertheless under a duty to act with the court
when it appeared that without his participation no decision could be reached;
"actual disqualification of a member of a court of last resort will not excuse such
member from performing his official duty if failure to do so would result in a
denial of a litigant's constitutional right to have a question, properly presented
to such court, adjudicated." 1 State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 157
Kan. 622, 143 P. (2d) 652 (1943).

1

Principal case, 143 P. (2d) 652 at 656 (1943).
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There is an exception to the rule that a disqualified judge cannot act. 11
The exception may be stated as follows: A judge or an officer exercising judicial
functions 3 may act in a proceeding wherein he is disqualified if the tribunal's
jurisdiction is exclusive and there is no legal provision for calling in a substitute,
so that his refusal to act would prevent a determination of the proceeding.4
Some courts have refused to apply this doctrine of necessity.I' The reasons for
the withdrawal of a disqualified judge are (a) the interest of the litigant in a
fair trial 6 (b) the preservation of public confidence in the courts 7 and ( c)
personal reluctance on the part of the judge.8 The reasons for participation by
a disqualified judge where necessity requires it are (a) the constitutional right
11 When the protested judge is a member of an inferior tribunal and there is a provision for a substitution of personnel or change of venue, a judge who may be directly
affected in a pecuniary way by the result of the decision is disqualified. 42 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 788 (1913).
8 Brinkley v. Hassig, (C.C.A. 10th, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 351 (state medical board);
Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, (D.C. Mont. 1935) 12 F. Supp.
946.
4 McCoy v. Handlin, 35 S.D. 487, 153 N.W. 361 (1915); after quoting from
the constitution the court in Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 at 185 (1870) made
.this oft-repeated statement, "The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes
necessary for a judge to sit even where he has an interest-where no provision is made
for calling another in, or where no one else can take his place--it is his duty to hear
and decide, however disagreeable it may be. The rights of the other party require it.,,
See also State ex rel. Null v. Polley, 34 S.D. 565, 138 N.W. 300 (1914); and I
ELLIOTT, GENERAL PRAcTicE, § 157 (1894) and cases there cited.
Courts of last resort have heard appeals even though their members were interested in the result of the proceedings. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 40 S. Ct. 550, II
A.L.R. 519 at 532 (1919) (federal income tax on all federal judges); McCoy v.
Handlin, 35 S.D. 487, 153 N.W. 361 (1915) (application of statute providing for increase in judicial income); State ex rel 'Null v. Polley, 34 S.D. 565, 138 N.W. 300
(1914) (questio~ concerning an extension of the judicial term of office).
11 Anonymous, I Salk. 396, 91 Eng. Rep. 343 (1698) (Sole judge held disqualified who was lessor of plaintiff in ejectment); in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 320 U.S. 708, 64 S. Ct. 73 {1943) the court in a short statement said, "As
four Justices have disqualified themselves from participating in the decision in each of
these cases, the Court is unable to make final disposition of them because of the absence
of a quorum of six Justices as prescribed by 28 U,S.C. § 321. These cases will accordingly be transferred to a special docket and all further proceedings in them postponed in each case until such time as there is a quorum of Justices qualified to sit in it, ·
when it will be restored to the regular docket for such further proceedings as may be
appropriate."
6 State ex rel. Mi,ckle v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 1382, 131 So. 331 (1930). (Every litigant includes the state.) .
7 ld. For a discussion of this matter, see 29 HARv. L .. REV. 103 (1915); 13
CoRN. L. Q. 454 (1928) and cases there cited.
8 It would seem that there is a superior duty to the state which overshadows personal taste but the present Supreme Court of the United States has failed to achieve its
sj:atutory quorum due to voluntary disqualifications.
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to a hearing 9 and the statutory right to an appeal 10 (b) special public interest
in the expeclitious trial of the particular case involved,11 and ( c) serious doubt
that the presumption of impartiality is well founded. 12 There are varying ex9 In addition to the principal case, the following cases contain statements to the
effect that there is a constitutional right to have a matter litigated in spite of disqualified judges: Jeffersonian Pub. Co. v. Hilliard, 105 Ala. 576, 17 So. 112 (1894)
(Statutory disqualification yields to a paramount constitutional right to administration of
justice); in McCoy v. Handlin, 35 S.D. 487, 153 N.W. 361 (1915) the same disqualification was found in the only other forum where a delay would have been fatal
to plaintiff's cause. The court at p. 495 quoted from the constitution the following:
"All courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done him iJ his property, person,
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice, administered without denial or delay." The court at pp. 495-496 then said, "Under such a
constitution, can any one, simply because he chances to be the judge of a court, or
because of any other situation in which he may be placed, be deprived of his property
'Without due process of law'? Ct1ti the doors of justice be closed or their opening
eoen delayed to his apped, t1tid he be depN'{Jed or delayed of a remedy 'by due course
of lflW,' and thus denied 'right t1tid justice,' simply because the only court in which a
remedy can be sought is presided over by judges having an interest either like or adverse to that of the one seeking such remedy? The Constitution, the supreme law of this
state, answers this question in the negative. The courts, provided by such Constitution,
must open their doors to the call of all, and no court can refuse to hear a cause simply
because its judges are interested and the law has made no provision for anyone to take
their places." In State ex rel. Null v. Polley, 34 S.D. 565 at 570, 138 N.W. 300
(1914) the court said, "In such cases the rule of disqualification of judges is deemed of
less importance than the denial of the constitutional right to a forum in which rights
may be adjudicated. And, however embarrassing the situation may be to us, we are
unanimously of opinion that this court should not abdicate its functions and duties in
any case, where such action would, in effect, deprive the citizen of his constitutional
rights."
Recusation offers a potent weapon to cause delay. See. the dissenting opinion in
People ex rel. Burke v. Dist. Ct., 60 Colo. I at 21, I 52 P. 149 ( 1915) for such an expression; also 29 HARV. L. REv. 430 (1916).
10 The right of· appeal is not essential to due process of law under the federal
constitution, Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 at 426, 14
S. Ct. 114 (1894); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 at 508, 23 S. Ct. 390 (1903).
11 This very situation now confronts the Supreme Court of the United States
which, because of voluntary disqualifications, coupled with the statute making six justices
necessary to a quorum, 36 Stat. L. 1152, § 215 (1911), 28 U.S.C. (1940), § 321, and
the judicially established practice of requiring a majority of the court to concur on
constitutional questions, Briscoe v. Commonwealth Bank of Ky., 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 118
(1834) has declared itself unable to hear two pressing matters, namely, North American
Co. v. Securities and Exchange CommissioJJ, 318 U.S. 750, 63 S. Ct. 764 (1943) in-•
volving the so-called "death sentence" clause of the 1935 Public Utility Holding Company Act, and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 320 U.S. 708, 64 S. Ct.
73 (1943). See Cunningham, "The Problem of the Supreme Court Quorum," 12
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1944) for some proposed solutions for the problem. The
expedient of compelling the justices to sit is not considered.
12 At common law there is no disqualification for bias or prejudice not based on
pecuniary interest. Elliott v. Hipp, 134 Ga. 844, 68 S.E. 736 (1910) [the case cites
17 AM. & ENG. ENc. LAW 738 (1900) and 23 CYc. OF LAW AND PRo. 582 (1908)];
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pressions concerning what constitutes necessity.18 The problem is made more
acute by quorum requirements for appellate courts.14 It would seem that to
administer the law in a practical way, none of th~ various reasons above suggested
for excluding or retaining a disqualified judge should be looked upon as an absolute test to be rigidly applied, but that they should all be assigned such values
as appear reasonable and proper under the circumstances. The result reached in
the principal case appears to be in harmony with this view.
W. Theodore Markwood

State ex rel. Germain v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 56 Nev. 331, 51 P. (2d) 219, 102
A.L.R. 393 at 397 (1935).
A judge is disqualified for a direct pecuniary interest. State ex rel. Williams v.
Ellis, 184 lnd. 307 at 314, II2 N.E. 98 (1916). (The maxim of law that a person
cannot b_e a judge of his own cause has become a univer~lly recognized principle.) See
also 30 AM. Ju~. 771, 783 ff; 33 C. J. 991.
It appears that the rule of disqualification for prior participation in or connection
with a cause grew out of voluntary recusation. 25 L.R.A. II4 at II7 (1894), Ann.
Cas. 1913C, 251 at 254.
One wonders at the failure of the United States Supreme Court to distinguish
between disqualification for knowledge of the subject matter and direct interests of the
justices. The voluntary disqualifications of the Supreme Court Justices apparently rest
on the former services rendered by the justices as federal administrators in the offices
of Attorney General, Solicitory General, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In the absence of statute it would seem that the common-law rule should be applied
without question. See Barber County Commissioners v. Lake State Bank, 123 Kan: IO
at 13, 254 P. 401 (1927} to the effect that judicial notice will be taken of the fact that
the Attorney General's office is a busy place and that a number of attorneys are there
employed.
Cf. 36 Stat. L. 1087 at§ 21 (19u), 28 U.S.C: (1940) § 25, a statute concerning interest which does not apply to appellate tribunals. It is quite possible that impartial training and the duty assumed under the solemn judicial oath serve to overcome
human frailties, especially among justices of our higher courts.
18 The classic statement seems to be that necessity does not exist simply because
other justices cannot agree on a decision, or because a given result will not be attained,
or because of public inconvenience, oi: of delay not resulting in injustice to a party.
Stahl v. Board of Supervisors, 187 Iowa 1342, 175 N.W. 772, II A.L.R. 185 at 193
(1920). The finding of exclusive jurisdiction coupled with a failure to provide for
substitution has been held to show necessity without more. Montana Power Co. v.
Public Service Commission, (D.C. Mont. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 946; see also 30 AM. JuR.
770 ff; L.R.A. 1915E, 858.
14 One justice constituted the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to hear Commonwealth v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 A. 961 (1904) when all the others became disqualified and there was no statutory or constitutional requirement as to number of
judges.
A disqualified judge has been counted as a member of the court for purposes of
constituting a quorum. Nephi Irrigation Co. v. Jenkins, 8 Utah 452, 32 P. 699
(1-893).

